"ta pathe" namely pleasure (edone) and pain (alghedon), represent the third criterion
of truth envisioned by Epicurean Canonic. Besides acting as practical criteria
directly pointed to action, these two affections work as gnoseological criteria, employed
by "dianoria" in order to distinguish between actions that should be performed
and those we should rather avoid. The present contribution argues that even
before any rational operation, namely in thinking them as something self-evident
(enarghes) and a-rational (alogon), these “basic” feelings – Epicurus’ "pathe" and,
above all, Lucretius’ uoluptas and dolor – may rightfully be described as criteria
of truth: a truth which is at “zero grade” and which pertains to things rather than
judgements, but which nonetheless possesses an unquestionable epistemological
value.