This article aims to develop an application of virtue theory to the domain of legal reasoning. It argues that a virtue-based theory of legal reasoning illuminates some key aspects of legal reasoning that are peripheral in the standard, principle-based, theories of legal reasoning. More specifically, it claims that a virtue-centered theory of legal reasoning emphasizes the importance of fitting one’s judgment to the particulars of the case, brings to light the emotional and perceptual dimensions of legal argument, and highlights the relevance of description and specification for sound legal reasoning. The paper concludes by suggesting that a virtue perspective on legal reasoning shows that there are important connections between theories of legal ethics and theories of legal reasoning, thereby leading to a significant expansion of the field

The essay focuses on the relationship between virtue jurisprudence and legal senti- mentalism to argue that both emphasize the importance of emotions in assessing legal rights and duties. Based on the readings of Aristotle’s normative texts, Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric and Politics, it advances the claims that emotions are elements of virtue so that no judicial virtue can exist without them; and that distributive and corrective justice as the primary virtues of the judge require peculiar emotions. The argument is however based on the assumption that the boundaries of judicial review cannot simply be established by the virtue and proper emotions of the judge

In this article there is an exposition of the meaning and roots of the “rule of law ideaµ, distinguishing its classical meaning from the Enlightenment one and relating the first with the virtue ethics and the concept of human rights. In that way, the complete formula of the common good – and of general justice – includes the supremacy of law or practical reason, plus the virtues of rulers and ruled and the consideration and respect of natural human rights