The paper is intended to give a conceptual definition of relativism, with the aim of singling out the possible basic elements common to all the most relevant relativist conceptions. In conformity with my definition, we have to qualify as «relativistic» all the conceptions according to which all or a relevant part of – cognitive, semantic, ethic, cultural etc. – criteria and beliefs are necessary dependent on a given context (paradigm, culture, language, conceptual scheme etc.), that is by its turn chosen as point of reference. From this point of view it is «absolutism» which stands in radical

opposition to relativism. In the second part of the paper I will deal with some important critical observations which have been recurrently aroused against relativism. From this point of view, a quite serious problem arises from the fact that many relativists would like to have the chance, at least in some important cases, of expressing some objective judgements, for instance in terms of ethically «right» or «wrong», or in terms of empirically «true» or «false». In the third part of my paper, in order to answer to this difficulty, I will propose a sketch of a viable and coherent relativistic conception: a conception that doesn’t incorporate at all absolutist elements and that nevertheless could be able to explain the presence of a common core of criteria and beliefs in all our conceptual schemes and beliefs. One distinction is of particular importance here: the distinction between local conceptual schemes and long term frameworks, through which it is possible to clarify that even the most stable and consolidated beliefs common to our conceptual schemes are after all relative.

This article focuses on the theory of ethical relativism, in its normative and metaethical implications. It points out the many ways in which the views of normative ethical relativism and metaethical relativism can be interpreted, and the different meanings of the main concepts used in their formulation. The same ambiguity is present in a correlate concept: that of universality of ethical judgements.

The paper aims to analyse some aspects of the charge of incoherence usually levelled against relativism. I maintain that, if there are strong reasons to hold the incoherence of relativism, on the other side, there are no alternative options that can preserve the reality of differences. In the end, I suggest to assume the relativistic attitude as a reminder of the temporal and spatial incompleteness of our attempts to represent the world.

Aim of the essay is to define the moral relativism from a conceptual and historical point of view. The author analyses two different types of moral relativism and supports a so-called «reasonable» relativism: a form of relativism that is compatible with democracy and the rule of law. In this perspective, the «reasonable» relativism shows to be able to accept moral pluralism as a fact and to give importance to moral reasoning with regard to conflicts among moral principles.

This paper aims at a reconstruction of Radbruch’s relativistic conception of law within the framework of a model of principles. The idea of relativism remains a disputed issue in current legal and moral philosophy. In spite of the fact that Radbruch’s legal philosophy lacks coherence, it includes elements that resemble modern conceptions of law as a system including principles to be balanced against each other. Therefore, a reconstruction within a model of principles might as well prove the fruitfulness of the model of principles as render a more appropriate theoretical framework for Radbruch’s legal philosophy. After an outline of Radbruch’s relativism, I will discuss some critical points of his approach and, subsequently, present a reconstruction according to the model of principles, which makes plausible at least some of Radbruch’s contentions.

This paper offers a historical-conceptual reconstruction of Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation. My aim is threefold: first, shed light – through Kelsen’s critique to it – on the real nature of formalism in legal interpretation of xix century; second, understand whether this theory can fit to what H. L. A. Hart called «rule-scepticism» or to his theory of open texture – the most influential views in the current debate on legal interpretation –; third, try to solve that puzzle consisting in the full validity of a judicial decision lying «outside the frame represented by the norm to be applied» – a claim that not only appears a contradiction in itself, but that has raised many questions of compatibility with the entire pure theory of law.