“Sovereignismµ is one of the most recurrent notion in recent political debate, but the fundamental contradiction on which it rests – i.e., the impossible attempt at offering solutions to supra-national problems by reactivating the modern logic of nation-state sovereignty – has a longer history. This paper thus aims at outlining the phantasmatic reasons behind this anachronistic resurgence and the compulsion to repeat inherent in all sovereignist strategies. It starts by retracing a genealogy of the concept of sovereignism, showing how this latter is transversal to the traditional leftwing/rightwing divide. It then moves to highlight the three premises on which sovereignism lies – the appeal to State sovereignty, the call for the strengthening of popular sovereignty, the individual desire for sovereignty over oneself – while also showing the paradoxical outcomes of these premises when they are evoked within a framework in which the State, the people and the individual have been long undermined by neoliberal governmentality. Finally, it concludes by showing the hidden mechanism of the sovereignist trap, while also trying to point in the direction of a possible way out.

In this article sovereignism, as part and parcel of populism and the new “otherµ of democracy, is defined by the combination of three elements. First, the reduction of “the peopleµ as author of the Constitution to the electorate. Second, the consequent attribution of constituent power, or the power to reform the rules of the political process, to the electorate. Third, the assumption that one and only one correct interpretation exists of the general interest of the people, again reduced to the voters, and that intolerance vis-à-vis opponents is justified. The impressive flow of the sovereignist river is augmented by three unsuspected tributaries, that traverse areas of our political culture not directly related with populism.

This article analyzes and critically discusses the sovereignism (sovranismo) of the left. It shows how the challenge to the sovereign power comes today from corporate and financial globalization, which uses the institutions for civil and human rights protection in order to resist and oppose the decision-making prerogatives of sovereign communities, and democracies in particular. In the face of this unbalancing of powers, the sovereignty of the single states shows to be weak. Augmenting political sovereign power seems a better strategy for containing global capitalism. To this end, the EU emerges as an opportunity (although very imperfect) as also the decisions to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic shows.

This essay focuses on the institutional changes caused by the so-called sovereignisms, that invoke a return to State sovereignty as a point of gravity to redesign global power in national and international relations and promote a “trueµ democracy following a leader. Their institutional style closely resembles that of the Dadaist artistic movement, with its irreverent and derisory attitude towards established rules and settled belief. What they realize are authoritarian forms of democracy and a deep crisis of their institutional frame that parallels the crisis of the representative model. Trump can be seen as an exemplary model of this style and institutional damages caused by his institutional behavior are even more significant since they concern a country with ancient democratic roots and which is the most powerful nation in the world.

The essay analyzes the reasons of the increase in support of populist parties in Europe, as a consequence of the conversion of social democratic parties to the political and economic principles of neo-liberalism. This ideal homologation between right and left causes an increase in abstention by the population and an increase in consensus for far-right parties. In the author’s opinion, only by building a left-wing people and giving all social and economic categories reasons to recognize themselves in the traditional ideals of the left, will it be possible to defeat populist parties.

Contemporaneously, the ego tends to mirror itself as an ideal ego, subject and object of the self itself, aiming at the assertion of its proper supremacy. As a result the important role of limiting the narcissistic expansionism of the ego, as exercised by the subconscious, the body and concrete experience of the difference of other from self and the unassumable character of reality, is reduced. Hence, there is an insidious transformation of the relationships regarding relationships of power, with a distortion of the intersubjective field. The sense of differentiation of self/other from self and the sense of that which is “commonµ to everyone is perverted, and the intrapsychic differences are turned outwards projectively and radicalized into a persecutorial form. This supposed limitlessness of the ego renders psychic life barren and compromises the relationship with our vulnerability and our interdependence inasmuch as we are human beings, and with the impact of the dimension of commonality, as is clearly evident in the experience of the pandemic.

The essay discusses Carlo Galli’s book devoted to sovereignty, dwelling on its main passages: the concept of sovereignty, the relationship between the sovereign state and the rights of subjects, the discontinuity caused by the Second World War and the rise of constitutional democracies. Finally, the current situation is taken into consideration, focusing on the weakness of the nation states and the tensions within the European Union.

How do the populist regimes of the democracies and the authoritarian ones of the sovereign type relate to the nationalism that dominated above all the first part of the twentieth century and caused its greatest tragedies? After a brief analysis of what nationalism was in the nineteenth century and especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, the article examines the populist tradition in particular in Latin America and tries to identify the characteristics of the populist sovereignty present today in numerous regimes and countries, a phenomenon typical especially of the ?? st century. A comparison is established between the current trends (from those in Poland and Hungary to those in Venezuela, Russia and Turkey) and the authoritarian (and even fascist) ones of the 1920s and 1930s, identifying in the rejection of a constitutional logic of checks and balances the most significant similarity. The character of sovereignty is above all to emphasize the role of the state, while that of nationalism was to accentuate that of the nation.

After World War Two, a gigantic effort was made in order to build a viable and stable international order, beginning with the Bretton Woods agreement, which was aimed to stabilize the international monetary system, and with the United Nations, that were intended to restore legality in interstate affairs and provide a cosmopolitan conversation among Nation States. This order is now slowly crumbling down, paradoxically through globalization, and through a triumphant neoliberalism. Globalization have also radicalized a widespread sense of decadence and puzzlement, increasing a general feeling of losing firm ground. One of the main reactions to such a situation is often thematized as “populismµ. Nevertheless, the notion of populism is a vague and puzzling one. “Populismµ might be seen as a régime where affections are more powerful than rational interests. However, this use of such label implies a polemical judgment about the dissatisfaction of the status quo. Behind this “international disorderµ and the populist vindication a new – but indeed quite old – narrative of what a national identity could mean is again getting the upper hand.

The drastic change of political scenario occurred with the general elections of 4 March 2018 (the first «populist» victory in a large West European country) introduces substantial new elements in terms of political alliances to form the government. A government is born that sees together the two anti-establishment parties: the M5S (criticism of the institutions of representation) and the League(refusal of immigration). In the government action in the period between 2018 and 2019 the immigration issue is central in the public discourse of Italian political actors. The debate and legislation on the immigration issue has been monopolized by the Salvini League and the M5S (and the so-called contract governance). In a context of remarkably high volatility, lexploiting a relatively low level of ideological structuring of the electorate, security and immigration policies (for the affirmation of ethno-national identity) determine the outcome of the European elections. The great success of Salvini’s League leads to the breaking of the alliance of the two populist parties confirming the difficulty of governing protest movements.

This article analyzes the cultural dimension of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s illiberal governance. The sovereign “geocultureµ the Hungarian right has been building for decades represents a crucial, yet underestimated feature of the twilight of liberal democratic values in postcommunist Hungary. Taking up a wide range of scholarly theories, from postcolonial studies to the wallersteinian notion of semiperiphery, public intellectuals and pundits have made popular the notion that Hungary and Central Europe as a whole should replace a declining and self-hating post-Cold War Western Europe as main defender of core European values. They share Orbán’s view about an irreducible conflict going on in Europe between self-perceived “patriotsµ and “cosmopolitansµ. Culture and identity become in their everyday discoursive practice weapons to be used against all kind of enemies in order to legitimize the official discourse and further marginalize the already under attack liberal institutions and individuals.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, in a global cultural context enhancing the transnational and supranational dimension, we witnessed a re-evaluation of the category of “sovereigntyµ in the political debate in Russia. Vladislav Surkov, advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, was a central figure of this ideological and political operation. In 2005 the formula “sovereign democracyµ was introduced in the Russian political debate. The emphasis was on sovereignty. The aim was to claim independence from external conditioning and to re-establish Russia’s status as a great power. The recovery of the political (and geopolitical) subjectivity of the state emerged as a priority, in the sign of the myth of the “strong stateµ. The formula of “sovereign democracyµ contained also an inherent claim to cultural and ideological sovereignty, i.e. it expressed a desire to emancipate from subjection to Western political culture models.

During the past four years, sovereign ideology has been realized in a political discourse directly inspired by texts and concepts from the racist galaxy of supremacist extremism, Catholic and Western fundamentalism. In the author’s opinion, it is precisely in this context that Donald Trump’s political rise can be understood. The events of recent years have meant that it was the United States the country in which sovereignism and populism made their way into the institutions and Trump is the politician who brought to power the ideological demands of the most extreme and reactionary fringes of the American right.

The essay analyzes what unites the various conservative, neo-identity and the new right-wing movements in Germany, from a political and historical point of view. In particular, the essay analyzes the theoretical assumptions that make possible the union between these different movements, in order to understand why this political galaxy is currently particularly active. In the author’s opinion, right-wing populism in Germany could reactivate mechanisms, in the economic and political spheres, of criticism of globalization and reaffirmation of national interest, by hegemonizing different social groups, frightened by the economic crisis.

The (ir)resistible rise to power of the far right represented by Jair Bolsonaro takes place in the context of an institutional coup promoted by conservative forces, which happen in stages of traumatic form: “spontaneousµ demonstrations of 2013, impeachment of Dilma and coming into office of Temer government in 2016, President Lula’s prison in 2018 realized by judge Sergio Moro in Operation Lavajato (lawfare) and Bolsonaro’s victory and election in 2019. The question is: is it an alternation of government (albeit with anomalies), or a change of political regime? The article examines the two hypotheses that are still open in the fluid Brazilian political situation. Worrying signs lean towards the second hypotheses: the ideological war against the “enemyµ to be destroyed and the attack on human rights, the militarization of the government, the connivance and contiguity of the government with the milicias that control the territory, religious fundamentalism, especially neo-Pentecostal that makes an unscrupulous use of religion for political ends, the increasing police violence encouraged by the expansion of legitimate defence, the neoliberal policies that weaken the action of the State in the social and environmental area. All signs of a safeguarded democracy which must endure the daily wear and tear of the government’s subversive action.

Since before accession, the relationship between the UK and the process of European integration has been divided between the advantages of the single market and national pride. The oscillation between sentiments in favour of integration and the adoption of attitudes peculiarly distant from European politics has always been discernible in the leadership groups of the two major parties in Great Britain. This was especially the case with regard to issues relating to the Union’s monetary policy. The article argues that the issue of monetary sovereignty has been at the center of British public discourse for three decades, and how the fault lines between British politics and society have deepened around membership in the monetary unification process on the one hand. and the Union on the other. The deepening of the dynamics of inequality due both to the inefficiency of income redistribution strategies, and to the slowdown in the capacity for innovation and productivity of the British industrial system has prompted an electorate who is ready to seek an “external enemyµ to identify constraints of the Union which, for its part, did not shine for its capacity for renewal.